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Disaster and Disappointment in DC

  • Writer: JM
    JM
  • Dec 18, 2025
  • 7 min read

On 10 December, 2025, National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Chair Jennifer Hommendy held a press conference in which she blasted the House of Representatives proposed amendment to the Fiscal Year (FY) 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).  She opened the press conference by asserting:

“I want to be clear…it does not in any way enhance safety.  It reverses safety changes made after the midair collision, after issuance of our urgent safety recommendations, after the Secretary of Transportation – Sean Duffy – rightfully implemented our urgent safety recommendations, essentially gives the military unfettered access to the crowded and complex DC airspace.  In fact, it would allow the Secretary of any military department – generals, flag officials – to allow training missions in the DC airspace to take place without key safety reforms put in place after the January 29th midair collision.”[1]

Homendy’s open disagreement with pending legislation proved a rarity in American politics.  The nation doesn’t often witness an agency chair directing open disagreement toward one of the nation’s three branches of government.  But as one of the country’s top safety officials charged with investigating and preventing fatal events within our transportation system, Homendy seized upon the NTSB’s “congressional mandated independence” to hold the House accountable for working against the best interest of the flying public.[2] 


As a Certificated Flight Instructor (CFI) who teaches students and other pilots, her decision to speak up captured my attention.  Not solely because the CFI in me has a significant stake in air safety, but also because this veteran understands the military does require some latitude to effectively ensure national security.  Rules that might appear prudent on the surface sometimes tie the hands of our military – they can come at the expense of keeping us all safe from foreign observation or aggression.  I felt conflicted and desired to know who was in the right.  Thus began an arduous examination of the merits of Congress’ amended bill against the backdrop of the NTSB’s recommendations.

 

Before we dive into the legalese of Senate Bill S.2296 and the House Bill H.R. 3838 (i.e., NDAA 2026 and amendments, respectively), it’s worth taking a moment to recap the events that underscore Homendy’s frustration: 


“On January 29, 2025, about 2048 eastern standard time (EST), a Sikorsky UH-60L, operated by the US Army under the callsign PAT25, and an MHI (Mitsubishi Heavy Industries) RJ Aviation (formerly Bombardier) CL-600-2C10 (CRJ700), N709PS, operated by PSA Airlines as flight 5342, collided in flight approximately 0.5 miles southeast of Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA), Arlington, Virginia, and impacted the Potomac River in southwest Washington, District of Columbia.
The 2 pilots, 2 flight attendants, and 60 passengers aboard the airplane and all 3 crew members aboard the helicopter were fatally injured. Both aircraft were destroyed as a result of the accident. Flight 5342 was operating under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 as a scheduled domestic passenger flight from Wichita Dwight D. Eisenhower National Airport (ICT), Wichita, Kansas, to DCA. PAT25 originated from Davison Army Airfield (DAA), Fort Belvoir, Virginia, for the purpose of the pilot’s annual standardization evaluation with the use of night vision goggles (NVGs).”[3]

While this “preliminary” report doesn’t assign blame, the details suggested that the Army UH-60 Blackhawk pilots’ actions were a significant contributing factor.  They were flying at 300 feet – well above their maximum authorized altitude of 200 feet Above Ground Level (AGL) along the “helicopter route” they were navigating.  The Blackhawk pilots also did not “see and avoid” the oncoming traffic when Air Traffic Control (ATC) expressly ordered them to “pass behind” the approaching Regional Jet.[4]  Per Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs), pilots are ultimately responsible for collision avoidance in Visual Flight Rules (VFR) conditions and the Regional Jet retained the “right of way” in this instance.[5] 


The report also suggested that “understaffing” and the use of “different frequencies” at the DCA ATC Tower also contributed to this accident – that the combination of the “helicopter control and local control” responsibilities into a single position may have been cause for overwhelm.  The use of two different frequencies to communicate with each of the accident aircraft that evening also precluded them from hearing one another and generating greater situational awareness.[6]  While Advisory Circular (AC) 90-66C doesn’t apply at towered airfields like DCA, the guidance it gives to pilots alludes to the advantages of radio communications between aircraft.[7]  The ability to hear other pilots when transmitting position updates greatly aids in the prevention of midair collisions, whether the environment is towered or not. Thus, the NTSB issued the following “urgent recommendations” to the FAA in the wake of this tragedy on March 7th, 2025:

 

"To the Federal Aviation Administration:
Prohibit operations on helicopter Route 4 between Hains Point and the Wilson Bridge when runways 15 and 33 are being used for departures and arrivals, respectively, at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport. (A-25-1) (Urgent)
Designate an alternative helicopter route that can be used to facilitate travel between Hains Point and the Wilson Bridge when that segment of Route 4 is closed. (A-25-2) (Urgent)”[8]  

 

On 9 October, 2025 the NDAA passed the Senate with the supermajority (i.e., 60 votes or greater) required.  The bill then spent two months in the House of Representatives which proposed a number of important and controversial amendments (i.e., changes) to the original language.  Proposed amendment H.R. 3838 – Section 372 Manned Rotary Wing Aircraft Safety – didn’t agree with Homendy.  Some 256 pages into the 1,750-page document, the House proposed that:


“…except as provided in subsection (b), the Secretary of a military department may not authorize any manned rotary wing aircraft of the Department of Defense to operate a training mission in a highly trafficked domestic airspace…
The Secretary of a military department, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Transportation, may waive the limitation under subsection (a) with respect to the operation of an aircraft if the Secretary determines that—(1) such waiver is in the national security interests of the United States; and (2) a commercial aviation compatibility risk assessment has been conducted with respect to the operation of the aircraft pursuant to the waiver to mitigate the risk associated with such operation.”[9]

 

Put simply:  the Service Secretaries of the respective military branches (i.e., Department of the Army, etc.) may waive the NTSB’s recommendations to the FAA regarding suspending helicopter flights near DCA.  The military may fly helicopters along the same route PAT 25 flew leading up to the accident, thus permitting one of the accident’s leading causes to recommence.


The amendment does include a check on the military – requiring their leaders to seek approval from Transportation Secretary Duffy before proceeding and after performing a “risk assessment.”[10]  The military is also responsible for securing the airspace in and around the Flight Restricted Zone (FRZ) that surrounds Washington DC and must access that airspace to do so.  Upon initial examination, the manner in which these flights may resume appears cautious.

   

But in my humble opinion, Homendy was 100% correct to raise the alarm over this piece of proposed legislation.  While I greatly value our nation’s defense, I don’t see how the national security benefits of flying in close proximity to DCA outweigh the potential risk for fatal midair collisions.[11]  DC’s Helicopter Route Chart highlights several other routes that circumnavigate the DCA airfield and that meet a helicopter’s needs to transit that airspace without reinstating “route 4.”[12]  Flying helicopters around – versus next to DCA – will increase transit times, but the time saved by reinstating this route doesn’t justify the resumption of the risks to arriving or departing airliners.  Neither does reviving “route 4” as a flight training location justify the same.[13]  It was not the sole route along which government helicopter pilots might train for low-level night flight while using NVGs.


The Army helicopter was equipped with both a Mode-C transponder and an Automated Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADSB-out) system, but it wasn’t transmitting the latter at the time of the accident.[14]  This means that ATC could see PAT-25, but Flight 5346 could not see PAT-25 in addition to not hearing them on the radio.  While the government pilots are 100% in the right to turn off the ADSB-out transmitters and transponders to mask their identities or cloak their positions in combat zones, the decision to do so in US Airspace is more controversial.  We certainly do not want our adversaries tracking government aircraft on training missions – giving our enemies a clear picture of how they maneuver.  But that need for opacity must be balanced with the need to protect the very public the government defends. 


I feel Congress’ attempt to resume “business as usual” – supported by a subjective waiver program – to be a disappointing lapse in judgement.  The passage of the amended NDAA on 17 December all but legalized the resumption of helicopter flights near DCA, but that doesn’t necessarily make those future flights ethical.[15]  I’m certain that the majority of the American public will agree that the resumption of these flights near DCA proves callous and unnecessarily hazardous in the wake of this tragedy.  The requiring of a formal “risk assessment” or a secretary’s approval – or not requiring ADSB for all aircraft transiting that airspace – doesn’t grant the victims or their families any justice. Neither do the above limitations mitigate the risk of another midair collision as much as permanently closing “route 4” will.  “Route 4’s” previous revocation greatly reduced the future potential of another tragedy and we’d be wise and commendable to keep it that way. More prudent still might be the reconsideration of ADSB for all aircraft transiting that airspace.

 

Fly on Folks,

Josh Meyer

                  


[1] “NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy slams proposed safety changes in NDAA,” WCNC – Charlotte, YouTube, 2025:  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IXj9fICdU7s

[2] “About the NTSB,” NTSB, NTSB.org, 2025:  https://www.ntsb.gov/about/Pages/default.aspx

[3] “Aviation Investigation Preliminary Report,” NTSB, NTSB.org, 2025:  https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Documents/DCA25MA108%20Prelim.pdf

[4] Ibid.

[6] “Aviation Investigation Preliminary Report,” NTSB, NTSB.gov, 2025:  https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Documents/DCA25MA108%20Prelim.pdf

[8] “Deconflict Airplane and Helicopter Traffic in the Vicinity of Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport,” NTSB, NTSB.gov, 2025:  https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AIR2501.pdf

[9] H.R. 3838, United States House of Representatives, Congress.gov, 2025:  https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/3838/text

[10] H.R. 3838, United States House of Representatives, Congress.gov, 2025:  https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/3838/text

[12] Helicopter Route Chart – Baltimore-Washington, FAA, 1800WXbrief.com, 2025:  https://www.1800wxbrief.com/Website/interactiveMap

[13] H.R. 3838, United States House of Representatives, Congress.gov, 2025:  https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/3838/text

[14] “Aviation Investigation Preliminary Report,” NTSB, NTSB.org, 2025:  https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Documents/DCA25MA108%20Prelim.pdf

[15] “Senate passes NDAA in 77-20 vote, sending $900 billion defense policy bill to Trump,” Kaia Hubbard, CBSnews.com, 2025: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/senate-passes-ndaa-defense-bill-trump/

 
 
 

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